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Abstract
In this paper we study the ine!ciencies of the monetary equilibrium and optimal monetary
policies in a search economy. We show that the same frictions that give !at money a positive
value generate an ine!cient quantity of goods in each trade and an ine!cient number of trades
(or search decisions). The Friedman rule eliminates the !rst ine!ciency and the Hosios rule
the second. A monetary equilibrium attains the social optimum if and only if both rules are
satis!ed. When the two rules cannot be satis!ed simultaneously, which occurs in a large set
of economies, optimal monetary policy achieves only the second best. We analyze when the
second-best monetary policy exceeds the Friedman rule and when it obeys the Friedman rule.
Furthermore, we extend the analysis to an economy with barter and show how the Hosios rule
must be modi!ed in order to internalize all search externalities.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the ine!ciencies of the monetary equilibrium and optimal monetary
policies in a search economy. The same frictions that give !at money a positive value generate
two ine!ciencies in the monetary equilibrium. To eliminate these ine!ciencies, the equilibrium
must satisfy both the Friedman rule (1969) and the Hosios (1990) rule. These two rules give
con"icting descriptions for optimal monetary policy. We show when optimal money growth obeys
the Friedman rule and when it exceeds the Friedman rule.
All well-speci!ed monetary models use frictions in the goods market to support positively
valued !at money. In search monetary models pioneered by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993),
the frictions are decentralized exchanges, as modelled by random bilateral matching, and private
trading histories (see Kocherlakota 1998). These frictions make it di!cult for agents to execute
all socially desirable trades. Money facilitates exchange and improves social welfare by enabling
agents to trade more e!ciently than barter in matches where the two agents have only single
coincidence of wants.1 The monetary equilibrium in such an economy exhibits two types of
ine!ciency. One is that the quantity of goods in each trade is ine!cient, because the buyer in
the match is constrained by the real money balance. The other is that the number of trades
is ine!cient, because agents ignore the externalities that their search decisions create on other
agents’ matching probabilities.
Standard monetary models possess the !rst type of ine!ciency but not the second. In those
models, markets are assumed to be Walrasian and so the number of trades is immaterial, provided
that prices clear the markets. As a result, monetary policy can restore e!ciency by following the
Friedman rule, the simplest form of which requires the money stock to contract at the discount
rate.2 The Friedman rule maximizes the real value of money, thus making the money constraint
non-binding and inducing the e!cient quantity of trade. When exchanges are decentralized, how-
ever, the Friedman rule may fail to restore e!ciency because it may fail to correct the ine!cient
number of trades generated by search externalities.
The Hosios rule describes how a market can internalize search externalities. First proposed
by Mortensen (1982) and then shown more generally by Hosios (1990), this rule requires that
the match surplus in a trade be divided between the two agents to properly compensate their
search decisions. More precisely, buyers’ (or sellers’) share of the match surplus should be equal
1More generally, money facilitates exchanges in asymmetric matches, those in which the two agents have either
asymmetric bargaining powers or asymmetric demands for each other’s goods. The lack of double coincidence
of wants is an extreme form of asymmetric demands, but not a necessary condition for money to be valued and
welfare-improving in a search model. See Engineer and Shi (1998, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003).
2Woodford (1990) describes a variety of ways to state the Friedman rule and surveys the literature of traditional
monetary models along this line. For convenience, we interpret the Friedman rule as a requirement on the contrac-
tion rate of the money stock, because our model focuses on the e"ects of money growth. Some other interpretations
of the Friedman rule, such as a zero net nominal interest rate, are also valid in our model.
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to these agents’ share of contribution to the total number of trades. The Hosios rule is well
established in the labor search literature pioneered by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and
Pissarides (1990). However, it is a stringent requirement and seemingly unrelated to monetary
policy. In most search models, the surplus shares and the matching shares are both exogenous
parameters determined, respectively, by the Nash bargaining formula and a matching function.
Such economies satisfy the Hosios rule only if one assumes that the two unrelated parameters are
equal to each other, with which monetary policy has nothing to do.
Our model provides an intimate link between the Hosios rule and monetary policy. Crucial
to this link is the result, emphasized !rst by Shi (2001a), that the surplus division in a monetary
trade is endogenous when the trade is constrained by the buyer’s real money balance. This
constraint allows the buyer to credibly limit his o"er in bargaining, thus extracting a larger share
than if there is no such constraint. The extent to which the buyer can increase his surplus share
is determined by how severely the trade is constrained by the real money balance, and hence by
monetary policy. When money growth obeys the Friedman rule, the money constraint does not
bind and so the buyer’s surplus share reaches a constant lower bound ! " !"" #$, which coincides
with the exogenous surplus share in the Nash bargaining formula. An increase in the money
growth rate, by reducing the real value of money, makes the money constraint more binding and
hence !"#$%&'%' the buyer’s surplus share, although it also reduces the total surplus in the trade.
Through this e"ect on the surplus division, monetary policy can help the equilibrium satisfy the
Hosios rule.
The Friedman rule and the Hosios rule exert di"erent pressures on optimal monetary policy.
The Friedman rule maximizes the real money balance, and so it induces an e!cient quantity of
goods in each trade, or equivalently, an e!cient size of the match surplus. However, it does not
necessarily induce a division of the surplus that is required for search decisions to be e!cient.
On the other hand, monetary policy under the Hosios rule induces an e!cient division of the
surplus but it does not necessarily generate an e!cient size of the surplus. The two rules coincide
with each other if and only if buyers’ share in the matching function under the Friedman rule,
denoted #!, is equal to buyers’ surplus share in unconstrained bargaining (i.e., !). In this case,
the Friedman rule achieves the social optimum. In all other economies, optimal monetary policy
achieves the second best.
The second-best monetary policy depends on whether ! $ #!. If ! $ #!, the Hosios rule
requires the money growth rate to exceed the Friedman rule. In this case, the equilibrium under
the Friedman rule generates ine!cient search decisions, because buyers get a surplus share less
than their share of contribution to matches, while the equilibrium under the Hosios rule generates
an ine!ciently low quantity of goods in each trade. To make the best compromise between the
e!cient size and the e!cient division of the match surplus, the optimal money growth rate
exceeds the Friedman rule and is lower than what the Hosios rule requires. If ! % #!, the Hosios
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rule requires the money growth rate to be lower than the Friedman rule, which is infeasible in
the monetary equilibrium. In this case, the Friedman rule is optimal, as it achieves the e!cient
quantity of goods in each trade and brings search decisions closer to the e!cient ones than does
any other feasible money growth rate.
We extend these results to an economy where barter and monetary trades both exist. In such
an economy, the original Hosios rule fails to internalize all search externalities, because it does
not incorporate search externalities between the two types of trades. In particular, monetary
trades crowd out barter trades. The Hosios rule in its original form does not incorporate this
negative externality and as a result, it compensates money holders exceedingly and producers
de!ciently. To internalize all search externalities, we propose a measure of the e"ective number
of trade matches. This allows us to modify the Hosios rule in an intuitive way and to adapt the
above e!ciency results to the economy with barter.
The papers closest to ours are Li (1995, 1997) and Shi (1997, 2001a). Using a search model
with indivisible money and indivisible goods, Li provides important insights into how monetary
policy can induce e!cient search decisions. However, the assumption of indivisible money makes
the model incapable of examining the e"ects of money growth or associating the Friedman rule
with money growth.3 Also, because goods are indivisible in Li’s model, there is no ine!ciency
in the quantity of goods in each trade, thus precluding the trade-o" between this e!ciency in
the intensive margin of trade and the e!ciency in the extensive margin. To analyze e!ciency
adequately, we adopt the search model with divisible money and divisible goods, developed in
a series of papers by Shi. Some results in this paper have their precursors in Shi (1997). For
example, the Friedman rule is optimal when search intensities are exogenous and endogenous
search decisions can push the optimal money growth rate above the Friedman rule.4
Our paper makes two main contributions. First, we study the ine!ciencies in monetary search
models systematically. By adopting a general matching function, we are able to attribute ine!-
cient search decisions formally to the violation of the Hosios rule. This allows us to characterize
optimal monetary policies generally as a compromise between the Friedman rule and the Hosios
rule.5 Because the Hosios rule is well known in the labor search literature, our analysis also serves
as an interesting link between the monetary search literature and the labor search literature. Sec-
ond, we modify the Hosios rule to incorporate barter trades. This modi!cation is an important
3To examine the Friedman rule in a model with indivisible money, one must allow the government to pay interest
in terms of consumption goods to money holdings. When such an interest payment gives money a rate of return
equal to the discount rate, the Friedman rule is satis!ed. However, this version of the Friedman rule has nothing
to do with money growth and, because of the interest payment, money is not strictly !at.
4Some other authors have also examined the Friedman rule using variations of Shi’s divisible-money models. For
example, Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003) emphasize the ine!ciency of barter when there is asymmetric demand
in matches, and Faig (2001) emphasizes the relationship between the production sector and the commerce sector.
5We examine the search externalities both through the choice of the fraction of buyers as in Shi (1997, 1999a)
and through the search intensity as in Li (1995, 1997).
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contribution to the search literature, because the method is generally useful for characterizing
e!cient search decisions with heterogeneous types of trades.
A majority of money search models assume either indivisible money (e.g., Shi 1995 and Trejos
and Wright 1995), or indivisible goods (e.g., Green and Zhou 1998), or both (e.g., Kiyotaki
and Wright 1991, 1993). These are not just technical assumptions (Berentsen and Rocheteau
2002). In particular, models with indivisible money are incapable of analyzing money growth and
unnecessarily tie the fraction of money holders in the economy to the money stock. As a result,
many previous models mistake an optimal fraction of money holders for an optimum quantity of
money. We will illustrate this mistake in section 5.4.
Most analyses of the Friedman rule employ standard monetary models that assume centralized
exchanges such as Walrasian markets (see Woodford 1990 for a survey). We choose a search
model instead, for two reasons. First, search models clearly specify the physical environment in
which !at money can be positively valued in equilibrium, and so the welfare analysis is internally
consistent.6 Second, the very frictions that support positively valued !at money in the search
model generate the two ine!ciencies of trades in our model and cause the Friedman rule to be
sub-optimal in some cases. In contrast, traditional analyses make the Friedman rule sub-optimal
by introducing additional elements, such as distortionary taxes (Chamley 1985 and Chari, et
al. 1991) and monopolistic competition (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2000). These distortions are
realistic, but they are not necessary for supporting positively valued money. As a result, the sub-
optimality of the Friedman rule in those models is not robust, in the sense that other policies such
as !scal policies are the best policies to eliminate the distortions. The same corrective prescription
does not work in our model without eliminating the role of money (see more discussions in the
conclusion).
The Friedman rule can also be sub-optimal in economies where there is a need to redistribute
liquidity between di"erent types of agents. One such model is the Bewley (1980) model, where
agents face income risks and there is no market to contract over future income. If some agents’
consumption levels are forced into a corner solution in certain states of nature, an expansionary
monetary policy can increase welfare by providing liquidity to such agents (see Levine 1991 and
Woodford 1990). Molico (1997) and Deviatov and Wallace (2001) make a similar argument in
search models of indivisible money, where the random-matching shocks generate a distribution
of money holdings across agents and force some agents’ consumption to be ine!ciently low.
We eliminate this ine!ciency by making the distribution of money holdings degenerate across
households, in order to focus on the ine!ciency of search decisions. Other related models are
variations of the Townsend (1980) model (e.g., Shi 1996b) or Williamson (1996), where spatial or
sequential separation of markets can create the need for redistribution. Our model also creates
6See Wallace (2001) for the arguments why traditional monetary models are not suitable for analyzing the role
of money in improving welfare.
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market separation, through bilateral matching. However, the fundamental source of the sub-
optimality of the Friedman rule in our model, i.e., the ine!cient number of trades, is a non-
Walrasian feature that does not exist in these Walrasian models.
2 ,ouseholds and )atching
The environment is similar to that of Shi (1999a, 2001a), except for the addition of the choice of
search intensities and the use of a more general matching function.
2.1 ,ouseholds
Time is discrete. The economy consists of & types of in!nitely-lived households where & is
a large number. Each type consists of a large number of households, normalized to size one.
Use lower-case letters to denote a particular household’s variables and capital-case letters other
households’ variables or aggregate variables.
A household ' is specialized in both production and consumption. Until section 6, we assume
that preferences and technologies are such that barter trades cannot occur. So, for the moment,
all trades involve the use of an intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible and storable object called
money. Goods are perfectly divisible and perishable. The utility of consuming ( units of con-
sumption goods is )!($ and the disutility of producing ( units of goods is *!($. For simplicity, let
)!($ % )!(, where )! % " is a constant, so that the cost is measured in utility. The cost function
satis!es *!"$ % ", *!!($ % ", *!!"$ % ", and *!!!($ % ". We assume that there exists (! " !""#$
such that *!!(!$ % )!.
Each household consists of a large number of members who carry out di"erent tasks but regard
the household’s utility as the common objective.7 The size of the members in each household is
normalized to one. There are two types of members in each household, buyers and sellers. Buyers
use money to purchase the household’s consumption goods and sellers produce. For the moment,
we !x the composition of buyers and sellers, with a fraction + of the members being buyers and
a fraction # $ + sellers, where " $ + $ # (we endogenize + in section 5.4). Each buyer carries
,!-+ units of money into the market, where ,! is the household’s total money holdings before
the market opens in period .. Before the members go to the market, the household chooses the
search intensity /" for each buyer and /# for each seller. The disutility of search intensities is
7The large household assumption, extending a similar one in Lucas (1990), makes the distribution of money
holdings degenerate across households and so allows for a tractable analysis of money growth and in"ation, see
Shi (1997, 1998, 1999a, 2001a), Head and Shi (2000), and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001, 2002, 2003). Lagos
and Wright (2002) adopt a di"erent assumption to make the money distribution degenerate. They assume that,
after the random-matching market closes in each period, a Walrasian market opens in which agents can trade a
homogeneous good whose utility and cost functions are both linear. This achieves the same purpose as risk-sharing
in our large household and generates the same analytical results.
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0!/$ and, to ease exposition, we specify 0!/$ % 00!/
$ $ #$, where 00 % " and 1 % #.
The household also prescribes the trading strategies to the members to carry out in matches,
which will be described later in a sequential bargaining game. Since goods and money are perfectly
divisible, agents can exchange any quantity of money and goods as they wish, provided that the
traded quantity of money does not exceed what the buyer in the match has.
After trading, the household pools the consumption goods purchased by the buyers and evenly
distributes them to the members for consumption. The household also pools the money balance
acquired in trade or left over from trade, to be allocated to buyers in the next period. Before
proceeding to the next period, the household receives a lump-sum transfer of money 2! % !3 $
#$4!, where 4! is the money holding per household in period . and 3 is a constant gross rate of
growth of 4 .
2.2 )atching function
Agents are matched randomly and bilaterally in the market. We are interested in the matches
where a trade can occur, i.e., where the seller can produce the buyer’s consumption goods. Call
such a match a ($&)% *&(#+. Let 5 % &6 be the total number of buyers in the economy and
7 % &!# $ 6$ the number of sellers, where 6 % + is the number (and the fraction) of buyers
per household (the distinction between 6 and + is meaningful only when + is endogenous). Let
!" be the average search intensity of buyers and !# of sellers. The aggregate search intensity of
buyers is 5!" and of sellers 7!#. We sometimes refer to these search intensities as search units.
The total number of trade matches in a period is given by a matching function,! !5!"" 7!#$.
As is common in the labor search literature (e.g., Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982, and Pissarides
1990), the matching function is strictly increasing and concave in the two arguments, and is
linearly homogeneous. De!ne the tightness of the market by
8 % 7!#-!5!"$ % !#$6$!#-!6!"$9 (1)
If 8 is high, the market is thick for buyers and thin for sellers.
An important characteristic of the matching function is the marginal contributions of each
side of the market to the number of trade matches, de!ned below:
:"!8 $ % ;!!5!"" 7!#$
;!5!"$
, :#!8 $ % ;!!5!"" 7!#$
;!7!#$
9 (2)
Because the matching function is linearly homogeneous, the total number of trade matches is the
sum of the two sides’ contributions, i.e.,!!5!"" 7!#$ % :"5!"&:#7!#. The share of buyers’
contribution to trade matches is de!ned as
#!8 $ % :"5!"-!9 (3)
Clearly, the share of sellers’ contribution is #$ #, and # " '"" #(.
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We can also calculate the average matching rate per search intensity for buyers and sellers,
respectively, as follows:
<"!8 $ % ! !5!"" 7!#$ -!5!"$ %! !#" 8 $ " (4)
<#!8 $ % ! !5!"" 7!#$ -!7!#$ %! !#" 8 $ -89 (5)
We have <"!8 $ % 8<#!8 $, <!"!8 $ % ", <
!!
" !8 $ $ ", <
!
#!8 $ $ " and <
!!
#!8 $ % ". Moreover, the
matching rates !<"" <#$ and the marginal contributions !:"":#$ are related to each other as
follows:
:"!8 $ % #!8 $<"!8 $" :#!8 $ % '#$ #!8 $(<#!8 $"
#!8 $ % #$ 8<!"!8 $-<"!8 $ % $8<!#!8 $-<#!8 $9
Because of the last relationship, we also call #!8 $ the elasticity of the matching rate <#!8 $.
Individual households take aggregate search intensities and aggregate numbers of buyers and
sellers as given. So, they take the tightness 8 and the rates !<"" <#$ as given. Note that <" and
<# are the average matching rates per search intensity, not the matching rates per person. The
latter can be in"uenced by individual households’ choices of search intensity. For a household
that chooses search intensity /" for its buyers and /# for its sellers, each buyer has a trade match
with probability /"<"!8 $ and each seller with probability /#<#!8 $.8
Two special cases of the above matching function are worth noting. One is as follows:
!!5!"" 7!#$ % =!5!"$!7!#$
5!" & 7!#
%
=!6!"$!#$6$!#
6!" & !#$6$!# " (6)
where = % " is a constant. This speci!cation implies #!8 $ % 8-!# & 8 $, <"!8 $ % =8-!# & 8 $
and <#!8 $ % =-!# & 8 $. Since <"!8 $ & <#!8 $ % =, we call the above matching technology the
&))!(!,%-*&(#+!".-$&(% (%#+"/0/.1. This matching function encompasses the matching technology
used in most monetary search models as a special case. In the latter models, the number of trade
matches (in the absence of barter) is =6!# $ 6$, which can be obtained from (6) by setting
!" % !# and = to the probability of a single coincidence of wants between two randomly selected
agents.
The second special case of the matching function is the Cobb-Douglas function:
! !5!"" 7!#$ % =!5!"$%!7!#$1"%" " $ # $ #9 (7)
This speci!cation implies #!8 $ % #, <"!8 $ % =8 1"% and <#!8 $ % =8"%. The Cobb-Douglas
matching function has been frequently used in labor search models and, recently, in monetary
search models (Li 1997, Shi 1998 and Head and Shi 2000).
8We assume M (!!!" #!") $ #$%(!"#) so that %!&! $ %!'!! and %"&" $ %"'!". Thus, individual agents’
matching rates are indeed probabilities in or near symmetric equilibria.
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The main di"erence between the two special cases is that the share # is a constant in the
Cobb-Douglas function but a function of 8 in the additive-matching-rate function. In general, #
can be increasing, decreasing or independent of 8 . An example of #!!8 $ $ " is the CES matching
function where the elasticity of substitution between the two factors is less than #. For various
proofs of existence, we restrict the extent to which #!8 $ decreases with 8 if #!!8 $ $ ". Precisely,
denote
>!8 $ %
#
8
!
#
#!8 $
$ #
"
9 (8)
We assume > !!8 $ $ ", >!"$ % " and >!#$ $#. These technical assumptions are satis!ed by all
examples we mentioned so far, including the CES matching technology.
2.3 Search eAternalities and the ,osios rule
Each household takes the matching rates !<"" <#$ as given and ignores the in"uence of its search
decisions on other households’ matching rates. This ignorance creates two types of externalities,
as is well known in the labor search literature. To see these externalities, consider a household
that increases its buyers’ search intensity marginally. This decision makes the market marginally
thicker for sellers than before and thinner for buyers. That is, the matching probability of other
households’ sellers increases, which is a positive externality, but the matching probability of
buyers decreases, which is a negative externality. Similarly, a seller’s search decision creates two
opposite externalities.
The search decisions are socially e!cient only when the opposite externalities cancel each
other. This is achieved if the economy satis!es the Hosios (1990) rule, which requires that agents
be compensated according to their contributions to the match formation. That is, the share of
the match surplus that buyers (sellers) get in trades should be equal to the share that such agents’
search intensities contribute to the number of trade matches. More precisely, if " is a buyer’s
surplus share in a trade, then the Hosios rule requires:9
" % #!8 $9 (9)
In bargaining games with transferable utility, the share " is usually constant and equal to the
exogenous bargaining weight of buyers in the Nash bargaining solution. If the matching function
is Cobb-Douglas, then # is also constant, in which case the Hosios rule exogenously ties the two
constants. If # depends on 8 , as in the additive-matching-rate function, the Hosios rule requires
8 to have a particular value. In contrast, our model generates an endogenous " that depends on
monetary policy. So, monetary policy can achieve the Hosios rule even when # is constant.
9Note that the matching function must be linearly homogeneous, which we assume, in order for the buyers’
and sellers’ surplus shares to be both equal to their corresponding shares of contribution to the number of trade
matches.
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3 Social Bptimum
We !rst describe the social optimum. Since all households are identical, it is natural to require
the social planner to treat them equally and to describe the same allocation for each household.
Like most analyses on the Friedman rule, we focus on social welfare in the steady state. The
social planner chooses the search intensity for each buyer and seller, !!""!#$, and the quantity of
goods produced in each trade match, ?, to maximize the following steady-state utility per period
of the representative household:
" %! !6!"" !#$6$!#$ ')!?$$ *!?$($60!!"$$ !#$6$0!!#$9 (10)
Here, we have divided the matching function by the number of households, &, to obtain the
number of trade matches per household, which is ! !6!"" !#$6$!#$. The !rst term in the
welfare function is a household’s total utility of consumption net disutility of production; the
remaining terms are the disutilities of search intensities. Clearly, any transfer between agents is
irrelevant for social welfare.
We have the following proposition:10
Proposition 1 2+% '/#!&0 /3(!*4* !' (+% '/04(!/" (/ (+% 5/00/6!". %74&(!/"'8
? % (!9 6+%$% *!!(!$ % )!" (11)
0!!!"$- ')!?$$ *!?$( % :"!8 $ !% #!8 $<"!8 $$" (12)
0!!!#$- ')!?$$ *!?$( % :#!8 $ !% '#$ #!8 $(<#!8 $$9 (13)
2+%$% %:!'(' & 4"!74% '/#!&0 /3(!*4*;
The social optimum requires e!ciency along two dimensions, the quantity of goods in each
trade, ?, and the total number of trade matches determined by search intensities. The quantity of
goods in each trade is e!cient if it equates the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal
cost of production. For @ " #A" B$, the search intensity is e!cient if the marginal cost of search
intensity, 0!!!&$, is equal to the corresponding social marginal contribution. The latter is the
marginal contribution of the agent’s search intensity to the number of trades, :&!8 $, times the
surplus generated in each trade, ')!?$$ *!?$(.
4 )onetary EFuilibrium
We now describe a representative household’s decision problem and the equilibrium.
10The proof of existence and uniqueness of the social optimum utilizes the functional form of (()) and the
assumptions on *(+ ) de!ned in (8). Other than this, the proof is straightforward and hence omitted.
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4.1 A householdGs decisions and bargaining
Consider an individual household’s decisions in a particular period .. Suppress the time subscript
.. Shorten the subscript . & # to &#, . $ # to $#, and so on. An individual household takes
as given the capital-case variables, i.e., other households decisions and aggregate variables. The
household’s decisions are the search intensities (/"" /#$, the money stock for the next period ,+1,
and the quantities !("" C") (#" C#) that the household instructs the members to propose in trade
matches.11 The quantity ( is the amount of goods that the household proposes for the seller in the
match to produce and C the amount of money that the buyer gives to the seller. The superscript
A indicates that the household’s member in the match is a buyer and the superscript B a seller.
The quantities !(" C$ are determined in sequential bargaining games with alternating o"ers.12
Consider a trade match between a member of the particular household in discussion and another
household’s member. Immediately after being matched, one of the two agents is chosen to be the
!rst proposer. To the proposal !(" C$, the other agent responds by either accepting it, or rejecting
it but staying in the game. If the agent accepts the o"er, the bargaining game ends. The seller
immediately produces ( units of goods for the buyer in exchange for C units of money and the
two agents depart from the match. If the respondent rejects the o"er but stays in the game, a
small interval of time # elapses, during which the negotiation can break down exogenously with
some probability. This breakdown risk depends on whether the agent who rejects the proposal
is a buyer or a seller. If a seller rejects a buyer’s o"er, the breakdown probability is !#, where
" $ ! & #. If a buyer rejects a seller’s o"er, the breakdown probability is !#$ !$#. When
the game breaks down, the two agents depart immediately and hold onto whatever they carried
into the match. If the game continues after the interval #, the two agents switch the proposing
and responding roles. The game continues until an o"er is accepted or there is an exogenous
breakdown.
We are interested in the bargaining outcomes when the interval # approaches ". In this
case, the !rst-mover advantage vanishes. So, we can simplify the exposition by assuming that
11 If a match is not a trade match, the household instructs its member to not trade. Also, notice that we treat the
relationship between a household and its members in the same way as Lucas (1990) does. That is, the members do
not play strategic games with the household; rather, they simply carry out the strategies that the household makes
before matching occurs. This treatment of the household is appropriate because the large household is no more
than a modelling device aimed at simplifying the analysis. However, if one is interested in possible deviations by
the members from the household’s decisions or out-of-equilibrium considerations, see Rauch (2000) and Berentsen
and Rocheteau (2001). See also our discussion in section 7.
12See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for a detailed treatment of sequential bargaining. A distinctive feature
of the game in our paper is that bargaining is constrained by the buyer’s real money balance and the value of
this constraint is endogenous to the household. To clearly reveal how much each party shares the shadow cost of
this money constraint, the sequential bargaining approach is superior to the axiomatic Nash bargaining approach.
Similar sequential bargaining problems with money constraints have been analyzed by Shi (2001a), Head and Shi
(2000), and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001 and 2003).
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the members of the particular household in discussion are the !rst proposer in the alternating-
o"er games in all trade matches that they experience. Let D!,$ denote the value function of
a household beginning the period with a money balance ,, where the dependence of the value
function on aggregate variables is suppressed. The marginal value of money in the next period,
discounted to the current period, is E % FD'!,+1$ where D' is the derivative of D with respect
to ,. Similarly, let $ denote the discounted marginal value of money of other households.
Consider a trade match that involves a buyer from the particular household in discussion.
The household instructs the buyer to propose C" units of money for (" units of goods. There are
two constraints on the proposing buyer’s household. First, the proposed amount of money cannot
exceed the buyer’s money holdings, i.e.,
,-+ ' C"9 (14)
This constraint must be satis!ed because trade is decentralized and so, during a match, each
buyer is separated from other members of the household. The second constraint on the o"er is
that it must give the partner a surplus that is greater than or equal to the reservation surplus.
This is because it is not optimal to make an o"er that the partner will reject, given that the
match is a trade match. The household of the partner (a seller) obtains a surplus $C" $ *!("$ by
accepting the o"er, where $C" is the value of the amount of money to the recipient’s household
and *!("$ is the production cost. Let G# denote the seller’s reservation surplus. Then, the buyer’s
proposal must satisfy:
$C" $ *!("$ ' G#9 (15)
To calculate G#, note that if the seller rejects the o"er (but stays in the game), the game passes
into the next round without breakdown with probability !# $ !#$, in which the seller proposes
!?#"H#$. Taking into account the breakdown probability, the seller’s reservation surplus is
G# % !#$ !#$ '$H# $ *!?#$( 9 (16)
Similarly, in a trade match where the particular household’s member is a seller, the proposal
((#" C#$ must satisfy
4-6 ' C#" (17)
)!(#$$$C# ' G"" (18)
where 4-6 is the money holding of the partner (a buyer from another household) and G" is the
buyer’s reservation surplus given below:
G" % '#$ !#$ !$#(
h
)!?"$$$H"
i
9 (19)
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Now we can describe the particular household’s choice problem. Taking the capital-case
variables as given, the household chooses I % !("" C") (#" C#),+1)/"" /#) to solve the following
dynamic programming problem:
!J&$ D!,$ % *+,
%
+/"<"!8 $)!(
"$$ !#$ +$/#<#!8 $*!(#$
$+0!/"$$ !#$ +$0!/#$ & FD!,+1$$
(20)
subject to the constraints (14), (15), (17), (18) and the following:
,+1 % ,& !#$ +$/#<#!8 $C# $ +/"<"!8 $C" & 29 (21)
The !rst term on the right-hand side of (20) is the utility of consumption, calculated as the
total number of trades the household’s buyers get, /"<"!8 $, times the utility of consumption in
each trade. Similarly, the second term on the right-hand side of (20) is the household’s disutility
of production. The third and fourth terms are the search cost of sellers and buyers respectively.
Eq (21) is the law of motion of the household’s money balance. The household begins the period
with a money balance ,. In the period, the household’s sellers acquire money through trade
and the buyers spend money, the amounts of which are given by the second and third terms
respectively. After trade, the household receives a lump-sum monetary transfer 2.
4.2 Bptimal choices and surplus division
Denote K as the Lagrangian multiplier associated with (14) and L with (17). Because these
constraints are applicable only when the household’s members are in trade matches, we scale the
multipliers by the number of the corresponding trade matches in order to incorporate them into
the Lagrangian, i.e., multiplying K by +/"<"!8 $ and L by !#$ +$/#<#!8 $. Suppose that money
is positively valued in the equilibrium, i.e., E % " and $ % ". Then, the choices
&
("" C"
'
and
!(#" C#$ satisfy the following !rst-order conditions:
)! %
E & K
$
*!!("$" (22)
*!!(#$ %
E $ L
$
)!" (23)
K
(,
+
$ C"
)
% "" (24)
L
!
4
6
$ C#
"
% "9 (25)
Eqs (24) and (25) are self-explanatory. To explain (22), note !rst that the constraint (15) must
bind when E % "; otherwise, the household could increase utility by reducing the buyer’s money
o"er. The equality of (15) implies that, for given G#, a marginal unit of consumption good
acquired by a proposing buyer costs *!!("$-$ units of money. When proposing an additional unit
of money, the buyer’s household foregoes the future value of money, E, and faces a tighter trading
12
restriction (14). Thus, !E&K$ is the marginal cost of money to the proposing buyer’s household,
and the amount of money needed to acquire a marginal unit of consumption costs !E&K$*!!("$-$.
Eq. (22) requires this cost to be equal to the marginal utility of consumption acquired by such
money.
Similarly, (18) must bind when E % " and the condition implies that a proposing seller sells
a marginal unit of good for )!-$ units of money. Eq. (23) requires that the marginal cost of
production be equal to the value of the acquired money, given by the right-hand side which
incorporates the cost of the constraint (17) to the proposing seller’s household.
In symmetric equilibria, which we will focus on, E % $, C& % H& and (& % ?&, where @ " #A" B$.
Then (22) and (23) imply that either K % " and L % ", or K % L % ". In the !rst case, (& $ (!,
and in the second case, (& % (!, for @ % A" B. Using these facts and (15), (16), (18) and (19), we
can show that, when # ( ", C" % C# % C and (" % (# % (. In addition, the following equation
holds:13
)!($$ EC % !)
!
!)! & !#$ !$ *!!($ ')!($$ *!($( " (26)
where C % ,-+ if K % " and ( % (! if K % ".
An important property of the bargaining outcome is that the buyer’s share of the match
surplus is endogenous, as is evident in (26). To emphasize this endogenous share, denote it as
"!($ % !)
!
!)! & !#$ !$*!!($ 9 (27)
Clearly, the buyer’s share is bounded below by ! and is a decreasing function of (. Only when the
trading constraint (14) does not bind is the buyer’s share constant, in which case K % ", ( % (!
and " % !. When the trading constraint (14) binds, ( $ (! and so "!($ % !. Moreover, since
( decreases with money growth, as shown later, the buyer’s surplus share !"#$%&'%' with money
growth. Notice that the buyer’s share is always equal to the constant ! if money is assumed to
be indivisible, because then the constraint (14) is not meaningful.
The above features of the surplus share are established and explained in Shi (2001a). Let
us repeat some of the explanations here, because the endogenous surplus share is critical to our
analysis later. One explanation for why the money constraint a"ects " is that the constraint
changes the buyer’s threat point in bargaining. When the money constraint binds, the buyer can
use the constraint to credibly limit his o"er, so as to extract a larger share of the match surplus
13See Shi (2001a, Proposition 1) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001). The procedure is as follows. Imposing
symmetry and eliminating (,"" ,!) from (15), (16), (18) and (19), we have two equations involving (-!" .!;-"" .").
If / 0 0, then -" = -! = 1'2 in a symmetric equlibrium, and so the two equations solve for .! and ." as functions
of 1'2 and ". When " ! 0, applying l’Hopital’s rule to these solutions yields ." ! .! and (26). If / = 0, then
3 = 0 as well, and ." = .! = .! for all small ". Substituting these for (."" .!) in the two equations involving
(-!" .!;-"" ."), we can solve (-!" -") as functions of ". When " ! 0, applying l’Hopital’s rule to these solutions
yields -" ! -! and (26) with . = .!.
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than the unconstrained share !.14 Another explanation is that the seller, when it is his turn to
propose, can ask for no more money than the buyer has, and so he must share a part of the cost
associated with the money constraint. This reduces the seller’s share below the unconstrained
share !# $ !$ and increases the buyer’s share of surplus above the unconstrained share !!$. In
fact, if we use (23) to substitute *!!($, then " % !-'#$ !#$ !$L-E(, which shows that the buyer’s
surplus share increases with !# $ !$L-E, the cost of the money constraint borne by the seller.
With either explanation, higher money growth reduces the real money balance, makes the money
constraint more binding, and hence increases buyers’ surplus share.
To complete the characterization of the household’s optimal choices, let us derive the envelope
condition for , as follows:
E"1-F % E & /"<"!8 $K9 (28)
This condition states simply that the marginal value of money in the current period is equal to
the discounted future value of money plus the value that money has in alleviating the trading
constraint (14) in the current period.
Finally, the household’s search intensities satisfy the following conditions:
0!!/"$ % <"!8 $"!($ ')!($$ *!($( " (29)
0!!/#$ % <#!8 $ '#$"!($( ')!($$ *!($( 9 (30)
These conditions equate the private, rather than the social, cost and bene!t of search intensity.
For example, the bene!t to the household from increasing a buyer’s search intensity is the number
of trade matches such intensity generates, <", times the gain that the household gets from each
of such trades, "')!($ $ *!($(. Thus, how the match surplus is divided between a buyer and a
seller is important for the household’s search decisions. In contrast, this division is irrelevant for
the social optimum, as is clear from (12) and (13).
4.3 Symmetric monetary eFuilibria
Because all households are identical, it is natural to focus on symmetric equilibria.
Ie!nition 1 < '1**%($!# */"%(&$1 %74!0!=$!4* #/"'!'(' /5 &" !")!,!)4&0 +/4'%+/0)>' #+/!#%'
#I!$#!=09 6+%$% I % !("" C") (#" C#),+1)/"" /#$9 /(+%$ +/4'%+/0)'> #+/!#%' #M!$#!=09 &") (+% !*30!%)
'+&)/6 3$!#%' !E" K" L)$"%"&$ '4#+ (+&( (+% 5/00/6!". $%74!$%*%"(' &$% *%(8 ?!@ A/$ %,%$1 . ' "9
14To see how the trading constraint (14) changes the buyer’s threat point, it is useful to consider the following
Nash bargaining problem: #)*
*
4(.)" 5-+ /(#
$
" -)+% [5-" 6(.)]1"%. This cooperative problem yields the same
solution as the sequential bargaining problem. Although /(#
$
" -) = 0, the trading constraint a"ects how the
buyer’s threat point changes, at the margin, with the amount of money o"ered in the trade. Although other
speci!cations of the threat points can also lead to endogenous shares, as Randall Wright suggested to us, our
speci!cation is simple and yet e"ective.
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I! '/0,%' (+% !")!,!)4&0 +/4'%+/0)>' *&:!*!B&(!/" 3$/=0%* ?J&@9 .!,%" M &") /(+%$ #&3!(&0-#&'%
,&$!&=0%'C ?!!@ I! % M! 5/$ &00 . ' "C &") ?!!!@ " $ E!"14! $# 5/$ &00 .;
The requirement (i) is self-explanatory, while (ii) requires symmetry. To explain (iii), note
that the real money balance in a household in period . is E!"1,!-F. Thus, E!"14! % " requires
that money be positively valued, and E!"14! $# requires that the real money balance be !nite.
The latter is necessary to ensure that the !rst-order conditions for the household’s decisions
indeed characterize the optimal decisions.
As in Shi (1999a) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001), a monetary equilibrium exists only
for 3 ' F, and K % " if and only if 3 % F.15 If 3 % F, there are a continuum of monetary equilibria
with K % " that di"er from each other in the initial value of money, E"1, and the path of money
spent in trade, #C!$#!=0, but that have the same allocation !(" /"" /#$. Because this allocation can
be approached from the equilibrium with K % " by reducing 3 to F, we will characterize only the
equilibrium with K % ".
Furthermore, we restrict our attention to the steady state. In the steady state, the real money
balance, E"14 , is constant. Using this fact and substituting K from (22), we can rewrite (28) as
follows in the steady state:
)!
*!!($
% # &
#
/"<"!8 $
!
3
F
$ #
"
9 (31)
The steady state equilibrium allocation, (EC" /"" /#" ($, is the solution to (26), (29), (30), and
(31), with 8 % !#$+$/#-!+/"$. The following proposition, established in Appendix A, states the
condition under which a monetary steady state exists.
Proposition 2 < */"%(&$1 '(%&)1 '(&(% %:!'(' !5 &") /"01 !5 F & 3 & 3max9 5/$ '/*% 3max % F
)%!"%) !" <33%")!: <; 2+% */"%(&$1 '(%&)1 '(&(% 6!(+ (+% +!.+%'( ( +&' (+% 3$/3%$(!%' (+&(
I8-I3 $ "9 I(-I3 $ "9 I
(
(!
("
)
-I3 % "9 &") -.*)$*!8" ($ % !8 !" (!$9 6+%$%
8 ! %
,
#$ !
!
!
#$ +
+
"$"1-1+$
9 (32)
The existence region 'F" 3max( % 3 can be very large and there can be multiple steady states.16
As in Shi (2001a), multiplicity arises from the dependence of the surplus shares on K. If households
believe that the money constraint will not bind severely, then sellers’ surplus share will be high
and households will choose to let sellers search intensively. This will increase aggregate supply of
15To see this, note that / # 0 and so (28) implies 5& $ 7"15&"1, where the equality holds only when / = 0.
Interating on the inequality, we have 5&"18& $ (9'7)&5"180. Given 0 $ 5"180 $%, the equilibrium requirement
5&"18& 0 0 is satis!ed for all : only if 9 # 7. If / = 0, then 5&"18& = (9'7)&5"180, and so the equilibrium
requirement 5&"18& $% is satis!ed for all : only if 9 = 7.
16Consider an example where the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, 4(.) = 40. and 6(.) = 60.! (; # 1). Then
9max =% when < 0 <0 & 2"=+1'(;"1) and 9max $% when < $ <0. There are two steady states when < $ <0.
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goods and increase the purchasing power of money, which will indeed make the money constraint
less binding. On the other hand, if households believe that the money constraint will bind severely,
then sellers’ surplus share will be low and households will choose low search intensity for sellers.
This will reduce the purchasing power of money and hence indeed make the money constraint
more binding.
In the following analysis, we will focus on the steady state with the highest (. There are two
justi!cations. First, this steady state generates the least ine!ciency among all possible steady
states in the quantity of goods traded in each match. By focusing on such an equilibrium, we
ensure that our welfare results are not caused by our selection of an inferior equilibrium. Second,
the analytical properties of the steady state with the highest ( are invariant to whether there are
multiple steady states.
Proposition 2 shows that, in the steady state we focus on, an increase in money growth makes
the market thinner for buyers and reduces the quantity of goods traded in each trade match.
These e"ects occur through two channels. One is the so-called hot-potato e"ect of in"ation
in Li (1997) or, similarly, the trading-opportunity e"ect in Shi (1997). That is, when money
growth increases, the anticipated higher in"ation induces households to trade away money more
quickly than before, in an attempt to avoid the loss in the real value of money. To do so in a
non-Walrasian economy, households increase buyers’ search intensity relative to sellers’, and this
makes the market thinner for buyers. Similarly, a buyer in a trade match can demand fewer
goods for the money. The second channel is the response of the surplus shares. When anticipated
in"ation rises with increased money growth, households anticipate that the money constraint
will be more binding and hence will anticipate a lower surplus share for sellers. As a result,
households will reduce the quantity of goods each seller produces in a trade and reduce sellers’
search intensity relative to buyers’, the latter of which makes the market thinner for buyers.
5 Friedman Rule versus the ,osios Rule
There are two sources of ine!ciency in the monetary equilibrium, an ine!cient quantity of goods
in each trade !() and an ine!cient number of trades resulting from ine!cient search decisions
(/"" /#$. In this section, we !rst examine separately the money growth rate that achieves e!ciency
in each of these two dimensions and then put the two together to !nd the optimal money growth
rate.
5.1 Friedman rule achieves the e!cient Fuantity of trade
Consider !rst the money growth rate that achieves the e!cient quantity of goods in each trade.
More precisely, we constrain the social planner to choose the same search intensities as those in
the equilibrium and ask what money growth rate attains ( % (! in the equilibrium. With this
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constraint on the social planner, the conditions for e!cient search intensities, (12) and (13), no
longer apply. Because the equilibrium quantity of trade is given by (31), it is evident that ( $ (!
if and only if 3 % F. We immediately have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 D+%" (+% '/#!&0 /3(!*4* !' #/"'($&!"%) (/ +&,% (+% '&*% '%&$#+ !"(%"'!(!%' &' !" (+%
%74!0!=$!4*9 (+% A$!%)*&" $40% &((&!"' %!#!%"#1; A/$ &00 3 % F9 (+% %74!0!=$!4* 74&"(!(1 /5 .//)'
%:#+&".%) !" %&#+ ($&)% *&(#+ !' !"%!#!%"(01 0/6; E/#!&0 6%05&$% )%#$%&'%' !" (+% */"%1 .$/6(+
$&(%;
The Friedman rule is e!cient with constrained search intensities for precisely the same reason
that it is e!cient in a conventional (Walrasian) monetary model. That is, when the money growth
rate obeys the Friedman rule, the real money balance (E"14$ is maximized, which makes the
trading constraint (14) non-binding and so achieves the e!cient quantity of trade. Note that the
above lemma implies that the Friedman rule is e!cient when search intensities are exogenous.
Although this result has been established earlier by Shi (1997, p86), it has attracted only limited
attention in the concurrent monetary search literature. Most search models still assume indivisible
money, which forces the fraction of buyers in the economy to be equal to the quantity of money.
This leads to a mis-interpretation of the optimum quantity of money, as we will show in section
5.4.
5.2 ,osios rule may reFuire higher money gro9th than the Friedman rule
Now suppose that the social planner is constrained to choose the same quantity of goods in each
trade as in the equilibrium, but is able to choose search intensities. We ask what money growth
rate can induce equilibrium search intensities to be the same as the planner’s choices. Compare
the equilibrium conditions for search intensities, (29) and (30), with the e!cient counterparts, (12)
and (13). It is evident that equilibrium search intensities are e!cient if and only if "!($ % #!8 $,
i.e., if and only if the Hosios rule is satis!ed. Since both ( and 8 are endogenous in the current
case, there might be a money growth rate that generates such ( and 8 that satisfy the Hosios
rule. Denote this money growth rate as 3,, if it exists.
The money growth rate 3, can be found as follows. Impose the Hosios rule "!($ % #!8 $ and
use the formula of "!($ to solve for ( % (,!8 $, where (, is de!ned by
)!
*!!(,$
%
!#$ !$#!8 $
!'#$ #!8 $( 9 (33)
Substituting ( % (,!8 $ into (29) and (30), and noting /# % /"+8-!#$+$, we can solve !/"" /#" 8 $.
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Denote these solutions as !/," " /
,
# " 8
,$.17 Then, (31) yields
3, % F
.
# &
'#!8 ,$$ !(/,"<"!8,$
!'#$ #!8 ,$(
/
9 (34)
Because money growth rates below F are not feasible in equilibrium, we need 3, ' F. Clearly,
3, ' F if and only if #!8,$ ' !. Recall from Proposition 2 that equilibrium 8 and ( are decreasing
functions of 3. So, when #!8,$ ' !, we have !8 ," (,$ & !8 !" (!$, where 8 ! is the equilibrium
tightness at 3 % F. If #!8,$ $ !, even the lowest share for a buyer (achieved by the Friedman
rule) is still greater than #!8,$, and so the Hosios rule cannot be achieved by a feasible 3.
We summarize these results in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 D+%" (+% '/#!&0 /3(!*4* !' #/"'($&!"%) (/ +&,% (+% '&*% 74&"(!(1 /5 .//)' !" %&#+
($&)% &' !" (+% %74!0!=$!4*9 (+%$% %:!'(' & */"%1 .$/6(+ $&(% (+&( $%'(/$%' %!#!%"#1 !5 &") /"01
!5 #!8,$ ' !; 2+!' %!#!%"( */"%1 .$/6(+ $&(% 3, %:#%%)' (+% A$!%)*&" $40% !5 #!8,$ % ! &") !'
%74&0 (/ (+% A$!%)*&" $40% !5 #!8,$ % !; F5 #!8,$ $ !9 (+%$% !' "/ 5%&'!=0% */"%1 .$/6(+ $&(% (+&(
&#+!%,%' %!#!%"#1 &")9 &*/". &00 5%&'!=0% $&(%'9 (+% A$!%)*&" $40% =$!".' (+% %74!0!=$!4* #0/'%'(
(/ (+% %!#!%"( &00/#&(!/"9 6!(+ &" %!#!%"( (! &") &" !"%!#!%"(01 0/6 8 !;
The condition #!8,$ ' ! imposes restrictions on parameters. If the matching technology has
a constant elasticity #, as in the Cobb-Douglas matching function, then #!8,$ ' ! if and only
if # ' !. To illustrate this condition when #!8 $ is endogenous, consider the example where the
matching function has additive matching rates. Then, 8, %
&
1"-
-
'($"1)+($+1), and so #!8 ,$ ' !
if and only if
+ &
,
# &
!
!
#$ !
"($+1)+($"1)-"1
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It is important to understand why, in some cases, money growth must be higher than the
Friedman rule in order to induce e!cient search decisions. Consider the example of a constant
elasticity # % !. If money growth obeys the Friedman rule, buyers are compensated by a surplus
share "!(!$ % !, which is lower than their share of contribution to the trade matches, #. So,
buyers’ search intensity is ine!ciently low. If, instead, money supply grows at a slightly higher
rate than the Friedman rule, the real money balance is lower, and so the trading constraints on
money, (14) and (17), will be more binding. Because sellers share a part of the cost of those
money constraints, as explained before, sellers’ share of the surplus falls and buyers’ share rises.
(The function "!($ is a decreasing function of ( and hence an increasing function of 3.) This
brings the surplus division closer to the Hosios rule, and hence the search intensities closer to the
17These solutions exist and are unique. To see this, divide (29) by (30) and substitute . = .'(+ ). We have
+("1 =
&
1"$
$
'("1
*(+ ), where *()) is de!ned in (8). With the assumptions on * , it is evident that this equation
has a unique solution +' ' (0"%). Then (29) and (30) give the unique solutions (%'! " %'" ). We assume that
9' $ 9max.
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e!cient ones. Note that, to increase buyers’ '+&$% of surplus, in"ation must be increased rather
than decreased. However, since in"ation also reduces the total surplus in the match, the '!B% of
a buyer’s surplus may either increase or decrease with in"ation.
5.3 First-best and second-best policies
Let us now put the two dimensions of e!ciency together and examine optimal monetary policy.
We start with the following proposition:
Proposition 3 2+% */"%(&$1 %74!0!=$!4* #&" &((&!" (+% '/#!&0 /3(!*4* !5 &") /"01 !5 3 % F
&") #!8 !$ % !9 6+%$% 8 ! !' (+% %74!0!=$!4* (!.+("%'' &( 3 % F9 )%!"%) !" ?GH@;
This proposition comes from combining Lemmas 1 and 2, and hence the proof is omitted.
Those lemmas imply that the equilibrium attains the social optimum if and only if 3 % 3, % F.
For 3, % F, it is necessary and su!cient that #!8,$ % ! when ( % (!. By de!nition, 8 , % 8 ! if
( % (!. Thus, the equilibrium attains the !rst best if and only if it satis!es both the Friedman
rule (3 % F$ and the Hosios rule (i.e., #!8 !$ % !$.
When #!8 !$ &% !, the monetary equilibrium cannot achieve the !rst best, and so a money
growth rate is optimal only in the second-best sense. To examine the second-best policy, let"!3$
be the social welfare level generated by an equilibrium with a money growth rate 3 ' F. Using
(29) and (30), we can calculate:
" !!3$ %!!)! $ *!$I(
I3
& '#!8 $$"!($( !)$ *$!/#
/"
I!/"-/#$
I3
(35)
The !rst term on the right-hand side captures the welfare e"ect of money growth through the
quantity of goods in each trade. This welfare e"ect is strictly negative for all 3 % F and zero
at 3 % F, because I(-I3 $ " and )! % *! for all 3 % F while )! % *! at 3 % F. The second
term on the right-hand side of (35) captures the welfare e"ect of money growth through search
decisions. This welfare e"ect is ambiguous, depending on whether #!8 $ % "!($. Although money
growth increases buyers’ search intensity relative to sellers’, as stated in Proposition 2, such an
increase in /"-/# increases welfare if and only if #!8 $ % "!($. The second-best policies can be
summarized in the following proposition (see Appendix A for a proof):
Proposition 4 F5 #!8 !$ % !9 (+% /3(!*&0 ?'%#/")-=%'(@ */"%1 .$/6(+ $&(% %:#%%)' (+% A$!%)*&"
$40% &") !' '($!#(01 0/6%$ (+&" 3, )%!"%) !" ?GI@; F5 #!8 !$ $ !9 (+% /3(!*&0 ?'%#/")-=%'(@ */"%1
.$/6(+ $&(% /=%1' (+% A$!%)*&" $40%; J/$%/,%$9 #!8 !$ % ! !5 &") /"01 !5 #!8,$ % !;
The di"erence between the two cases #!8 !$ $ ! and #!8 !$ % ! is subtle, although the
violation of the Hosios rule is the common cause of ine!ciency in both cases. When #!8 !$ $ !,
the money growth rate that achieves the Hosios rule is not feasible — it would destroy the monetary
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equilibrium. The Friedman rule is optimal in this case, because it achieves the e!cient quantity
of goods in each trade and, at the same time, brings the equilibrium closer to the Hosios rule
than does any other feasible money growth rate. When #!8 !$ % !, in contrast, it is feasible to
choose the money growth rate 3, that achieves the Hosios rule, but it is not optimal to do so.
At the rate 3,, the quantity of goods in each trade is too ine!ciently low to be justi!ed by the
improved e!ciency in the number of trades. Neither is it optimal to choose the Friedman rule,
because the number of trades under the Friedman rule is too ine!cient to be justi!ed by the
e!cient quantity of goods in each trade. The second-best money growth rate makes the optimal
compromise between these two dimensions of e!ciency, and so it lies between F and 3,.
Proposition 4 also states that #!8 !$ % ! if and only if #!8 ,$ % !. This is an alternative
statement of the fact that the ine!ciency in search decisions is the only possible cause for optimal
money growth to exceed the Friedman rule. If the search ine!ciency induces the constrained
optimum in Lemma 2 to call for 3, % F , then the unconstrained optimum must also require
3 % F as long as it values the search e!ciency. That is, #!8 ,$ % ! implies #!8 !$ % !. On
the other hand, if #!8,$ $ !, the constrained optimum calls for 3, % F to minimize the search
ine!ciency. To value this search e!ciency, the unconstrained optimum must not require 3 % F
in this case, and so #!8 !$ $ !.
5.4 Nhe misinterpretation of the optimum Fuantity of money in indivisible-
money models
The optimum quantity of money described in previous sections is very di"erent from that in
search models with indivisible money, such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Shi (1995) and Trejos
and Wright (1995). By forcing the fraction of buyers to be the same as the stock of money, the
assumption of indivisible money made those models mistake the optimal fraction of buyers for
the optimum quantity of money. To illustrate this mistake, we model the search decision in this
subsection as the choice of the fraction of buyers, +, rather than the search intensity.18 This
exercise also shows that our main results are robust to whether the search decision is modelled
as a choice of the search intensity or of the composition of agents. To simplify the analysis, we
assume in this subsection that search intensities are exogenously !xed at /" % /# % !" % !# % #.
In this case, the tightness of the market is 8 % !#$6$-6 . Also, note that 0!#$ % ".
The e!cient6 equates the marginal social surplus generated by a buyer to that by a seller, be-
cause an increase in the number of buyers reduces the number of sellers one for one. An additional
buyer contributes to the number of trades by :" and hence to social welfare by :"')!?$$ *!?$(.
Similarly, an additional seller contributes to social welfare by :#')!?$ $ *!?$(. Equating these
18Shi (1997) analyzes this choice 2 in a divisible-money search model. Although one can deduce the fallacy of
indivisible-money models by comparing their results with those in Shi (1997), it is useful to document the fallacy
here explicitly.
20
two surpluses and expressing the result in terms of #, we have the following condition for the
e!cient 6 :
6 % # !8 $ 9 (36)
In contrast, an individual household equates the private gain and loss associated with a higher
+. The private gain is <"')!($$!E&K$C(. The term KC is present because an increase in + reduces
the money balance that each individual buyer of the household carries into the trade match and
hence makes the trading constraint (14) more binding. The private loss from a higher + is the
surplus generated by an additional producer, which is <#'EC$ *!($(. Equating such private gain
and loss, and substituting K and EC from (22) and (26), we have the following condition for + (or
6) in the symmetric equilibrium:
6
#$6 %
"!($
#$"!($
0
#$
!
)!
*!!($
$ #
".
)!($
!)!($$ *!($$"!($ $ #
/1
9 (37)
Proposition 3 continues to hold. That is, the !rst-best allocation requires the Friedman rule
and the Hosios rule to both hold. First, money growth must be 3 % F in order for the quantity
of goods in each trade to be e!cient, i.e., for ( % (!. Second, when 3 % F, we have " % !, and
so (37) becomes 6! % !, where 6! is the fraction of buyers at 3 % F. Comparing this with the
e!cient counterpart (36), it is evident that the equilibrium 6 is e!cient if and only if #!8 !$ % !,
i.e., if and only if the Hosios condition is satis!ed.
Let us now tailor the above e!ciency result to the case often examined in indivisible-money
search models, i.e., the case where ! % #-/ and the matching function has additive matching rates.
In this case, #!8 $ % 8-!# & 8 $, and so the e!cient fraction of buyers is 6! % #-/. This number,
#-/, is exactly what indivisible-money models described as the optimum quantity of money in the
absence of barter (see Kiyotaki and Wright 1993). Our model shows that the optimum quantity of
money obeys the Friedman rule, instead. Clearly, this fallacy of indivisible-money models arises
from their inability to distinguish the fraction of buyers from the stock of money.19
Finally, when #!8 !$ &% !, the monetary equilibrium can only attain the second best. As
before, the second-best policy makes the optimal trade-o" between the e!ciency in ( and the
e!ciency in 6 , and the second-best money growth rate rate can exceed the Friedman rule when
! is su!ciently low. However, the general characterization of the second-best policy is not very
revealing, because an increase in the money growth rate can either increase or decrease 6 . We
omit such an analysis and refer to Shi (1997) for a similar analysis.
19 If a double coincidence of wants occurs with probability >2, a monetary equilibrium in this special economy is
e!cient if and only if 9 = 7 and ?! = ( 1
2
" >)'(1 " >) (see Shi 1997, p92). Again, the indivisible-money models
mistake such an e!cient fraction of buyers for the optimum quantity of money (see Kiyotaki and Wright 1993).
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6 Introducing Iouble Poincidence of Wants
When all trade matches involve only single coincidence of wants, producers and money holders
are symmetric in trade in the sense that every trade involves a buyer and a seller. When barter
can be successful, however, every trade has at least one producer but not necessarily a money
holder. The Hosios rule must be modi!ed to accommodate this asymmetry. We show how this
can be done in this section. Let us return to the setup where the fraction of buyers is !xed and
search intensities are endogenous. To avoid confusion, we now refer to an agent who is able to
produce as a producer (instead of a seller) and an agent who holds money as a money holder
(instead of a buyer). However, we still use the symbols 7 and 5 to denote the number of agents
in these two groups, respectively.
6.1 )atching technology
Assume that tastes and production technologies are such that barter is possible between some
producers. In particular, when a producer A randomly meets another producer B and happens
to be able to produce B’s consumption good, B can also produce A’s consumption good with a
conditional probability N " !"" #$ (conditional on that A can produce B’s consumption good).20
Since barter is possible, we extend the notion of trade matches to include both monetary and
barter trade matches.
To specify the matching function, note that social welfare depends on the output level, rather
than on the number of matches per se. For the analysis on e!ciency, it is useful to count the
number of times at which production takes place, rather than the number of trade matches. This
requires us to count each barter trade twice. For this reason, we call the number of times of
production the %"%#(!,% "4*=%$ /5 ($&)% *&(#+%' and assume that it is given by the following
matching function:
! !5!" & N7!#" 7!#$ 9 (38)
We assume that!!9" 9$ has all the properties assumed before. Clearly, the matching function in
previous sections corresponds to the special case N % ".
To understand the matching function, note !rst that every production involves at least a
producer, which is why producers’ search units appear as the second input of the function. Pick
an arbitrary producer, say <, and consider a match in which the partner wishes to consume
<’s goods. Producer < produces, i.e., the match is a trade match, if the partner is one of the
20For example, consider the following environment. Each type @ household produces only type @ good, as before,
but its consumption good is randomly drawn at the beginning of each period from the (A " 1) types other than @.
All type @ households have the same taste realization and so, as before, there is no gain for two households of the
same type to trade with each other. With this modi!cation, the conditional probability > is equal to 1'(A " 1).
The (unconditional) probability of a successful barter trade between two randomly matched producers is >'A.
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following two types. The !rst is a money holder. The total number of such potential partners is
5!". The second type is a producer who can produce the good that < wishes to consume. Since
each producer can produce the good that < wants with probability N (conditional on that < can
produce the good the partner wants), the total number of such potential partners is N7!#. Thus,
the !rst input of the matching function is the total search units of the partners with whom an
arbitrary producer can have a trade match.21
The function (38) also generalizes the matching technology commonly used in search money
models, such as Kiyotaki andWright (1993). To see this, it is useful to decompose! %!.&!',
where !. is the number of producers involved in barter trades !' the number of producers
in monetary trades. From the above explanation, it is clear that an arbitrary producer < has a
barter trade with probability N7!#-!5!" & N7!#$ % N8-!# & N8 $, and a monetary trade with
probability #-!#&N8 $, both being conditional on that producer < can produce the good that the
partner wants to consume. Thus,
!. % N8
# & N8
! !5!" & N7!#" 7!#$ % N7!#!
!
#"
8
# & N8
"
(39)
!' % #
# & N8
! !5!" & N7!#" 7!#$ % 5!"!
!
#"
8
# & N8
"
9 (40)
The matching technology in Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) corresponds to the special case where
!!C" O$ % =CO-'C& !#$ N$O( and !" % !# % #. In this case, !. % N=!#$6$2& is the number
of producers involved in barter trades and !' % =6!# $ 6$& is the number of producers in
monetary trades.22
Now we can de!ne the average matching rates per search intensity as before. Let <&/ denote
the average rate at which a unit of search intensity of type @ agents receives a type P trade match,
where @ " #A" B$ refers to money holders or producers and P " #I",$ refers to barter trades or
monetary trades. Then,
<#. %
!.
7!#
% N!
!
#"
8
# & N8
"
(41)
<#' %
!'
7!#
%
#
8
!
!
#"
8
# & N8
"
(42)
<"' %
!'
5!"
%!
!
#"
8
# & N8
"
9 (43)
21An implicit assumption here is that every search unit, regardless of whether it is a producer’s or a money
holder’s, has the same matching probability with a producer. If, instead, every producer’s search unit receives
the match at rate , relative to a money holder’s search unit, then the matching function should be modi!ed as
8(!!! +,>#!"" #!"). This modi!cation does not change our analytical results.
22Many search money models impose a further restriction > = B, where B is the probability with which an agent
wants to consume the good produced by a randomly selected partner. However, another variation, with B = 1'A
and > = 1'(A " 1), is also possible (see footnote 20).
23
Note that <". is not de!ned, because a money holder is never involved in a barter trade. Also,
<#. % N8<#'. Finally, for a money holder who searches with intensity /", his probability to trade
is /"<"'. For a producer who searches with intensity /#, his probability of having a monetary
trade is /#<#' and a barter trade /#<#..
6.2 Search eAternalities and the social optimum
Adding a money holder in the economy generates a crowding-out between the two types of trade
matches, as well as within monetary trade matches. To see this, denote :&/ as money holders’
(@ % A$ or producers’ (@ % B) marginal contribution to the number of type-P trade matches, where
P " #,"I$. Then,
:"/!8 $ % ;!/-;!5!"$, :#/!8 $ % ;!/-;!7!#$. (44)
>From (39) and (44), it can be checked that :". $ ", and so money holders crowd out barter
trades. For every money holder who !nds a monetary trade match, a producer is taken away
from possible barter trades with probability N8 . This negative externality between the two trade
types is in addition to the negative externality that the particular monetary trade generates on
other monetary trades.
Another way to see the crowding-out is to compute money holders’ and producers’ shares of
contribution to each type of trade matches. These shares are as follows, for P " #,"I$:
#"/!8 $ %
:"/!8 $5!"
!/ " ##/!8 $ %
:#/!8 $7!#
!/ % #$ #"/!8 $.
The fact #". $ " captures money holders’ crowding-out on barter trades. For the same reason,
producers’ share in barter matches is greater than # and, in fact, one can verify that ##. % #&##'.
In contrast, the shares in monetary trade matches satisfy #"'" ##' " '"" #(, as before. The
marginal contributions, the :’es, and the average matching rates, the <’es, are related to each
other through the following relationships:
:"' % #"'<"', :#' % ##'<#', :#. % ##.<#.9
We can adapt the analysis in section 3 to analyze the social optimum. Social welfare is
measured by the following steady state utility per period per household:
" % #
&
#!' ')!?$$ *!?$( &!. ')!?.$$ *!?.$($$60!!"$$ !#$6$0!!#$"
where ! ."!'$ are given by (39) and (40), and ?. denotes the quantity of goods produced by
each of the producers in a barter trade. Clearly, the social optimum requires ?. % ? % (!. To
facilitate discussion, we will set only ?. to (! and, for the moment, keep the notation ?. The
e!cient search intensities satisfy the following equations:
0!!!"$ % :"'!8 $'?$ *!?$( &:".!8 $'(! $ *!(!$(" (45)
0!!!#$ % :#'!8 $'?$ *!?$( &:#.!8 $'(! $ *!(!$(9 (46)
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6.3 )odi!ed ,osios rule and optimal money gro9th
We re-examine the monetary equilibrium. A typical household’s maximization problem is similar
to !J&$, with <"' replacing <" and <#' replacing <#. The objective function contains an
additional term, !#$+$/#<#.')!(.$$*!(.$(, which is the total surplus that the household obtains
through barter. The barter quantity (. is determined through sequential bargaining similar to
that for a monetary trade, where the proposing agent proposes two quantities, one for himself to
produce and the other for the partner to produce. Given the symmetry between two producers, it
is natural to assume that each faces the same breakdown probability after he rejects the partner’s
o"er. In this case, the two quantities are both equal to (. % (! (e.g., Shi 1995 and Trejos and
Wright 1995).
The quantity of goods exchanged in a monetary trade still satis!es (31) in the steady state,
with <"' replacing <". So, for this quantity to be e!cient, the money growth rate must obey
the Friedman rule. The household’s search intensities satisfy:
0!!/"$ % <"'!8 $"!($')!($$ *!($(" (47)
0!!/#$ % <#'!8 $'#$"!($(')!($$ *!($( &<#.!8 $')!(!$$ *!(!$(9 (48)
Compare the above equilibrium conditions with the corresponding e!cient conditions (45)
and (46). A stark contrast is that the barter surplus appears in the social planner’s choice of
money holders’ search intensity but not in the corresponding choice of the household. The social
planner takes into account money holders’ crowding-out on barter trades, as captured by:". $ ".
Individual households, however, ignore this externality. If money holders are compensated with
their contributions to monetary trades alone, i.e., if " % #"', then their search intensity is
ine!ciently high. Similarly, the crowding-out implies ##. % #, and so producers’ search intensity
is ine!ciently low under #$" % ##'. Therefore, the Hosios rule in the usual form, " % #"', no
longer internalizes all search externalities.
To implement e!cient search intensities, equate the right-hand side of the equilibrium condi-
tion (47) to that of (45), and (48) to (46). Doing so yields a single requirement, as follows:23
"!($ % #"'!8 $ & N8#".!8 $
)!(!$$ *!(!$
)!($$ *!($ 9 (49)
This is the */)!!%) K/'!/' $40%, under which equilibrium search intensities are e!cient. Because
#". $ ", the last term in (49) is negative, and so the modi!ed Hosios rule requires " $ #"'.
The di"erence between the e!cient #"' and " is the fraction of output which a monetary trade
crowds out on barter.
The modi!ed Hosios rule illustrates two potential reasons why the original form of the Hosios
rule can generate ine!ciency in search decisions when there are heterogeneous trades. One is that
23To get the requirement, we use the facts that C!#'&!# = =!# and C!)'&!# = >+=!).
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it fails to take into account the potential di"erence in the quantity of goods between heterogeneous
trades. Since it is the social surpluses from various trades, not the number of trades per se, that
are important for social welfare, the search externalities must be weighted by the social surpluses
of the corresponding trades in order to determine the e!cient compensation. If di"erent types
of trades involve di"erent quantities of goods, then the search externalities involving these trades
must be weighted di"erently in the e!cient compensation scheme, as is evident in (49). Although
such heterogeneous weighting scheme drops out in the !rst-best allocation in our model, as ( % (!
in this case, it is not a robust result. In an extension where tastes are asymmetric (e.g., Berentsen
and Rocheteau 2001a), almost all trades involve di"erent quantities of goods and so they must be
weighted di"erently for e!ciency considerations. Even in our model, the heterogeneous weighting
scheme is important in the second-best allocation, where ( &% (!.
The second reason why the original form of the Hosios rule is not reliable is that it equates
the surplus share to the share or elasticity of a matching function. When there are heterogeneous
trades and not all agents are involved in all trades, it is not clear how to calculate a share or
an elasticity of a matching function that is comparable to the surplus share. To illustrate this
point, consider the case where ( % (!, which occurs under the Friedman rule. Then, the modi!ed
Hosios rule (49) can be written as:
"!(!$ % !:"' &:".$-<"'9 (50)
This expression for the e!cient compensation is more reliable than the original form of the Hosios
rule. Intuitively, it requires that each money holder’s surplus in a period, "!(!$<"'')!(!$$*!(!$(,
be equal to the corresponding contribution to social surplus, !:"' & :".$')!(!$ $ *!(!$(. Note
that only monetary trades are counted in the calculation of a money holder’s average matching
rate, because a money holder gets the share " of surplus only in monetary trades. In contrast,
both types of trades are counted in the calculation of a money holder’s marginal contribution, in
order to incorporate all externalities that a money holder’s search decision creates on trades.
Nevertheless, if one wants to express (50) in terms of #, it is as follows:
"!(!$-!# & N8 $ % #"!8 $" (51)
where #" % 0"+0(1!!)"+(1!!) is the share of money holders’ search intensities to the e"ective number of
all trade matches. Note that a money holder’s surplus share is re-scaled by a factor #- !# & N8 $,
the fraction of trades that are monetary trades, in order to convert the share into an average
surplus share over all trades.
With the above modi!cation of the Hosios rule, we can easily adapt the results in section 5
into the current environment. First, the monetary equilibrium achieves the !rst-best allocation
if and only if 3 % F and #"!8
!$!# & N8 !$ % ! (="!(!$), where 8 ! is the equilibrium market
tightness at 3 % F. Second, if #"!8
!$!# & N8 !$ $ !, the Friedman rule is optimal, achieving the
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second best. Third, if #"!8
!$!# & N8 !$ % !, the optimal (second-best) money growth rate lies in
(F" 3,$. The rate 3, is calculated similarly to (34), using instead the modi!ed Hosios rule (49)
and the conditions (47)—(48) to solve for (8 ," /," " /
,
# " (
,!8,$$.
7 Iiscussion
In this section we discuss a di"erent trading mechanism and its implication for the results in
our paper. Our model underlies the following decision structure. All households determine
simultaneously their money holdings and the bargaining strategies for their members. After this
the members of the household carry out the strategies given to them by their households. Our
formulation involves some commitment because we assume that the households cannot condition
their bargaining strategies on the speci!c characteristics of their members future bargaining
partners. This commitment enable buyers to obtain the full return that an additional unit of
money provides to a match.
An alternative decision structure suggested by Rauch (2000) is to assume that the bargaining
strategies are determined ex post (after the matches have been formed). This decision structure
creates a so called hold-up problem because when a buyer, in an out-of-equilibrium match,24
brings an additional unit of money into a match, he does not receive the entire surplus that this
additional unit creates for the match, unless he has all the bargaining power. If buyers cannot
obtain the full return that an additional unit of money provides to the match, the purchasing
power of money will be ine!ciently low in equilibrium, and the Friedman rule will fail to generate
the !rst-best allocation of resources.25
To derive the envelope condition for the decision structure suggested by Rauch (2000), we have
to derive the derivatives .2
!
.' and
.2"
.' , respectively. To derive
.2!
.' we consider a match between
a buyer of the representative household and a seller from some other household. Furthermore,
we set C" % ,-+ because in the monetary equilibrium the constraint C" & ,-+ is binding. The
terms of trade in such a match satisfy
!)!
h
$*!("$ & $,
+
i
% !#$ !$*!!("$
h
)!("$$ E,
+
i
9 (52)
Totally di"erentiate (52), and note that in a symmetric equilibrium 4 % ,, $ % E, 6 % +,
(" % (, to get
I("
I,
%
E
+
Q !#$ !$ *!!($ '!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!( & '!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!(2
*!!($)! '!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!( & ! !#$ !$ ')!($$ *!($()!*!!!($ (53)
24 In equilibrium all buyers hold the same amount of money. Nevertheless, to determine the value of money one
has to consider matches where the buyers of the representative household hold di"erent amounts of money that
what is expected in equilibrium.
25For a detailed discussion of how the hold-up problem a"ects the validity of the Friedman rule see Berentsen
and Rocheteau (2001).
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where Q % .3.'
'
3 is the elasticity of the marginal value of money with respect to ,. We can
distinguish between a hold-up e"ect and a strategic e"ect. The second term in the numerator
represents the hold-up e"ect. It measure how the buyers consumption changes when , changes
holding E constant. The strategic e"ect is represented by the !rst term in the numerator and
measure how the terms-of-trade are a"ected when the marginal value of money changes in an
out-of-equilibrium match.26
The tricky part is to derive Q and we are not able to do so. Note, however, that the strategic
e"ect reduces the additional consumption that a buyer receives in a out-of-equilibrium match,
and consequently will depress the equilibrium value of money if the marginal value of money is
decreasing (Q $ ").27
To derive .2
"
.' we consider a match between a seller of the representative household and a
buyer from some other household. The terms of trade in such a match satisfy
!)!
.
$*!(#$ & E4
6
/
% !#$ !$*!!(#$
.
)!(#$$$4
6
/
9 (54)
Totally di"erentiate (54) and then impose 4 % ,, $ % E, 6 % +, (# % ( to get
I(#
I,
%
E
+
!Q '!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!(
*!!($ '!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!( & ! !#$ !$ ')!($$ *!($( *!!!($ (55)
Note that if the marginal value of money is decreasing (Q $ "), then .2
"
.' $ ". Thus, if Q $ ", the
strategic e"ect reduces the quantity that a seller has to produce in a out-of-equilibrium match,
and consequently will increase the equilibrium value of money.
At the symmetric equilibrium the envelope condition satis!es:
E"1
F
% E & /"<"!8 $K$ +/"<"!8 $E & K
$
G#' $ !#$ +$/#<#!8 $
E $ L
$
G"' (56)
where G#' %
3
- $ *! !($ .2
!
.' and G
"
' % )
! .2"
.' .
28 Replace G#' and G
"
' and use the !rst-order
conditions from the household problem to replace K, 3+4" , and
3"5
" respectively, to get
E"1
F
% E $ /"<"!8 $E & +/"<"!8 $)! I(
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(57)
In the steady-state the real value of money E"1, is constant and we can express the envelope
condition as follows
)!
+
E
I("
I,
$ *! !($ +
E
I(#
I,
%
3 $ F
F
#
/"<"!8 $
& # (58)
26Note that Rauch’s formulation implies that the players’ marginal values of money and their money holdings
are observable. This is a critical assumption because agents might have an incentive to hide their money holdings
in their backpockets in certain circumstances.
27Models with a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings are characterized by a decreasing marginal value
of money. See for example Berentsen (2002), Camera and Corbea (1999), Rocheteau (2000), and Zhou (1999).
28Note that if ,"# = ,
!
# = 0, the envelope condition is reduced to the one we have used so far in this paper. See
Berentsen and Rocheteau (2001).
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Note that the right-hand side of (58) is equivalent to the right-hand side of the envelope condition
we have used so far in this paper. If we assume that .2
!
.' %
3
-
1
60(2) and
.2"
.' % " and if we replace
these two expressions in (58), we obtain the envelope condition we have used so far in this paper
)!
*! !($
%
3 $ F
F
#
/"<"!8 $
& # (59)
We will refer to this speci!cation of the envelope condition as the E+! '3%#!!#&(!/" because it has
been proposed by Shi (1997).
Replacing .2
!
.' and
.2"
.' by using (53) and (55), respectively, the envelope condition (58) yields
!#$ /!$ Q*!!($ '!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!( & '!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!(2
*!!($ '!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!( & ! !#$ !$ ')!($$ *!($( *!!!($ %
3 $ F
F
#
/"<"!8 $
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We will refer to this speci!cation of the envelope condition as the L&4#+ '3%#!!#&(!/". Note that
the hold-up e"ect is again represented by the second term in the numerator. The strategic e"ect
is represented by the !rst term in the numerator. While the hold-up problem always depresses
the value of money, the impact of the strategic e"ect depends on Q and !. If the marginal value
of money is decreasing and if ! $ #-/, the strategic e"ect depresses the value of money even
further. In contrast if ! % #-/, it has a positive impact on the equilibrium value of money. The
problem is that we cannot say anything about the overall e"ect because we don’t know how to
derive Q. Consequently, we cannot simulate the optimal monetary policy as easily as would like
to do. Nevertheless we can study the optimal monetary policy of several special cases as we do
below.
Lagos and Wright S2002U. In Lagos and Wright the elasticity of the marginal value of
money is Q % ". Consequently, there is no strategic e"ect. This is so because of the special struc-
ture of their model, where agents can trade money in a centralized market at some exogenously
given market price 0. The main di"erence between the approaches of Lagos and Wright and Shi
is that in Shi the pooling of money holdings is within households whereas in Lagos and Wright
the pooling of money holdings is among all agents in the economy, which implies that in Shi
the marginal value of money E is household speci!c whereas in Lagos and Wright it is a market
price. The models have in common that the pooling generates degenerate distributions of money
holdings, which renders tractable models of fully divisible money.
If we set Q % " in (60) we get
'!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!(2
*!!($ '!#$ !$ *!!($ & !)!( & ! !#$ !$ ')!($$ *!($( *!!!($ %
3 $ F
F
#
/"<"!8 $
& # (61)
We will refer to this speci!cation of the envelope condition as the M&./'-D$!.+( '3%#!!#&(!/". For
this speci!cation we can easily simulate the optimal monetary policy. In our simulations we have
not found cases where it is optimal to deviate from the Friedman rule. Our simulations suggest
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the following reasons. First, the hold-up problem depresses the real stock of money so that under
the Friedman rule ( $ (!, unless the buyers have all the bargaining power. Consequently, in
contrast to the Shi speci!cation, a deviation from the Friedman rule has a negative !rst-order
intensive e"ect. Second, an increase in the in"ation rate no longer generates an increase in the
search intensity of buyers because the surplus of the buyer ("!($ ')!( $ *!($() is an increasing
function of ( for all ( " &"" (7' and it reaches a maximum at ( % (7 , where (7 is the quantity
of goods produced and exchanged under the Friedman rule. As a consequence, the in"ation tax
also reduces the buyers search intensities. Thus, in"ation has a negative intensive e"ect as well.
Symmetric bargaining. The case ! % #-/ has been studied by Rauch (2000). This case
is interesting because it also shuts o" the strategic e"ect, i.e., the elasticity Q vanishes in (60).
Consequently, the results of our simulations are equivalent to the results obtained from simulating
the Lagos-Wright speci!cation for ! % #-/.
Except for the special cases of symmetric bargaining and the Lagos-Wright speci!cation, we
are not able to simulate the Rauch approach. In particular, we cannot say anything of how the
strategic e"ect would impact the optimal policy in Rauch’s approach. For example, one interesting
case would be buyer-takes-all bargaining !! % #$ because this case shuts o" the hold-up e"ect but
not the strategic e"ect. For this case, however, we know that if the marginal value of Q is non-
increasing (Q & "), then in contrast to the Lagos-Wright speci!cation for all 3 ' F, the quantity
of goods traded will be larger or equal to the quantities traded in the Shi speci!cation that we
have used so far in this paper. The reason for this is that when ! % # the only active e"ect is the
strategic e"ect, which reduces the quantities that the sellers have to produce in out-of-equilibrium
matches, and consequently will increase the equilibrium value of money.
In summary, this section shows that the welfare implication of the model depends critically
on the speci!cation of the trading mechanism. Our approach and the approach by Rauch (2000)
have in common that they involve trading mechanisms that generate allocations in the pairwise
meetings that are incentive-feasible and pairwise Pareto e!cient. That is, both approaches select
allocations on the Pareto frontiers of the bargaining sets in all meetings. The main di"erence is
that in our approach the buyers have the full bargaining power on their marginal unit of money,
which involves di"erent bargaining weights in equilibrium and in out-of-equilibrium matches. To
the extend that choosing an allocation for a bilateral match involves always some arbitrariness,
there is not a priori one trading mechanism more reasonable than another. Di"erent trading
mechanisms involve di"erent protocols of bargaining (extensive forms) and the protocols might
depend on the characteristics of the players, that is, there might be di"erent protocols for equilib-
rium matches and out-of-equilibrium matches, where a player holds a di"erent amount of money
than what is expected in equilibrium.29 Another di"erence between the two approaches concerns
29Another paper that assumes di"erent bargaining weights for a player depending on his characteristics, respec-
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welfare. In our approach the Friedman rule implements the !rst-best, while in the Rauch for-
mulation because of the hold-up problem this is not the case. This suggest that in markets with
the hold-up problem institutions might evolve such as competitive search that do not generate
the hold-up ine!ciency and where a deviation from the Friedman rule can be optimal as in our
paper (see Rocheteau and Wright (2002)).
V Ponclusion
In this paper, we study the ine!ciencies of the monetary equilibrium and optimal monetary
policies in a search economy. We show that the same frictions that give !at money a positive
value generate two ine!ciencies. One is an ine!cient quantity of goods in each trade, due to the
constrained real money balance, and the other is an ine!cient number of trades, due to ine!cient
search decisions. The !rst ine!ciency is common in all monetary models and the Friedman rule is
required to eliminate it. The second ine!ciency is unique to markets with decentralized exchanges
and the Hosios (1990) rule is required to eliminate it. A monetary equilibrium attains the social
optimum if and only if both rules are satis!ed. This !rst best allocation cannot be attained when
buyers’ share in unconstrained bargaining (!$ is not equal to buyers’ equilibrium share in the
matching function under the Friedman rule, #!. In this case, the second-best money growth rate
obeys the Friedman rule when ! % #! and exceeds the Friedman rule when ! $ #!. We also show
why the Hosios rule fails to internalize search externalities when barter is possible and how the
rule can be modi!ed in such an economy.
The second-best monetary policy exceeds the Friedman rule in the case ! $ #! because higher
money growth can improve the e!ciency of search decisions and hence the number of trades
in this case. By increasing in"ation, higher money growth reduces the real money balance and
makes the trade more severely constrained by money. In this case, the buyer is able to extract a
larger share of the match surplus than before, thus leading to an increase in the relative search
intensity of buyers’ to sellers’. This outcome improves the e!ciency of search decisions when
buyers’ search intensity relative to sellers’ is de!cient under the Friedman rule, i.e., if ! $ #!.
Even in this case, the second-best money growth rate does not completely internalize the search
externalities, as the Hosios rule requires, because that would require too large a reduction in the
real money balance, and hence would exacerbate the ine!ciency in the quantity of goods in each
trade by too much, to be optimal.
We want to emphasize that the two ine!ciencies arise from the same frictions that support
the value of !at money. So, the welfare property of the Friedman rule, whether that being optimal
or sub-optimal, is inseparable from valued money. This feature of our model provides a defense
against the usual criticism that the presence of too many frictions and too few policy instruments
tively, the type of match he is in, is Ravikumar and Wallace (2003).
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is the cause of the sub-optimality of the Friedman rule. To clarify this issue, consider the case
! $ #!, where buyers’ search intensity relative to sellers’ is de!cient if money growth obeys the
Friedman rule. In this case, a lump-sum transfer from sellers to buyers can help internalize the
search externalities and restore the Friedman rule as the optimal monetary policy. However,
if such lump-sum transfers were unconstrained, then there would be no need for !at money in
the described environment: The social planner could achieve the social optimum by making the
transfer as large as the seller’s entire output in every match with a single coincidence of wants.
Thus, to examine additional policies in a meaningful way, these policies must not replace !at
money in the exchange and hence must be costly to implement. We plan to examine in a sequel
some of these costly policies, such as distortionary taxes.
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AppendiA
A Proofs of Propositions 2 and 4
We prove Proposition 2 !rst. Dividing (29) by (30), substituting " from (27) and using 0!/$ %
00!/
$ $ #$, we have:
( % R!8 $ % *!"1 &!8-8 !$$ )!' " (62)
where 8 ! is de!ned in (32). Note that R!!8 $ % ". Solve /" as a function of ( from (31).
Substitute this for /" and R!8 $ for ( into (29). Then, the equilibrium tightness is the solution to
S!8 $ % !3-F $ #$$"1, where
S!8 $ % '!8 !$$ $ 8$($"1
*
8 1"$<"!8 $
+$
')!R!8 $$$ *!R!8 $$(
100
.
# &
(
-
1"-
)$"1
8$
/ 9
We show that there exists a positive solution for 8 to the above equation. Because the
equilibrium must satisfy ( & (!, which requires 8 & R"1!(!$ % 8 !, the proper domain of 8
is '"" 8 !(. For 8 " '"" 8 !(, S!8 $ is continuous and di"erentiable. Note that S!8 !$ % " &
!3-F$#$$"1 for all 3 ' F. For there to be a solution for 8 in '"" 8 !(, it is necessary and su!cient
that S!8 $ ' !3-F $ #$$"1 for some 8 " '"" 8 !(, i.e., if and only if 3 & 3max where
3max % F
,
# &
!
*+,
8%[098 !]
S!8 $
"1+($"1)-
9 (63)
Because S!8 $ is continuous and the domain '"" 8 !( is a closed interval, 3max is well-de!ned.
Moreover, since S!8 !$ % " and -.*8&8!
:0(8!)
:(8!) % $#, we have S!8 $ % " for 8 su!ciently close
to but smaller than 8 !. Thus, 3max % F. If S!8 $ is maximized at 8 % ", then re-label 3max $ Q
as 3max, where Q % " is arbitrarily small, to ensure that the solution for 8 is positive at 3 % 3max.
Therefore, the monetary equilibrium exists i" 3 " 'F" 3max(.
The solution for 8 may not be unique. We focus on the solution that implies ( ( (! when
3 ( F, i.e., 8 ( 8 ! when 3 ( F. Only the largest solution for 8 has such a property. Because
S!8 $ exceeds !3-F $ #$$"1 for some 8 " !"" 8 !$ and falls below !3-F $ #$$"1 at 8 % 8 !, the
largest solution for 8 satis!es S!!8 $ $ ". This solution must then have the property I8-I3 $ ".
With this, (62) implies I(-I3 $ ". The de!nition of 8 implies /"-/# % !# $ +$-!+8 $. Since
I8-I3 $ ", we have I
(
(!
("
)
-I3 % ". This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
For Proposition 4, consider !rst the case #!8 !$ % ! and examine " !!3$ in (35). If 3 is set
at F, then )! % *!, 8 % 8 ! and " % !. The !rst term of " !!F$ is zero and the second term is
positive, implying " !!F$ % ". Thus, the second-best money growth rate exceeds the Friedman
rule. Similarly, if 3 is set to 3,, then )! $ *!, 8 % 8, and #!8,$ % "!(,$, implying " !!3,$ $ ".
Thus, the second-best money growth rate is lower than 3,.
Now consider the case #!8 !$ $ !. We show that #!8 $ $ "!($ in this case for all 3 ' F. Then,
the second term of " !!3$ is negative and " !!3$ $ " for all 3 ' F, implying that optimal money
growth is 3 % F. Consider the function T !8 $ % 8 '#!8 $$"!R!8 $$(, where R!8 $ is de!ned in (62)
and has the property R!!8 $ % ". Clearly, #!8 $ $ "!R!8 $$ i" T !8 $ $ ". Using (8) to substitute
#!8 $, it can be shown that there exists a unique 81 such that T !8 $ $ " is equivalent to 8 $ 81.
Since T !8,$ % ", 81 % 8 ,. Because I8-I3 $ ", we have T !8 $ $ " i" 3 % 3,. Because T !8 !$ $ "
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in the current case (i.e., #!8 !$ $ !) and 8 % 8 ! when 3 % F, we have F % 3,. Thus, T !8 $ $ "
for all 3 ' F in this case, as desired.
Finally, we show that #!8 !$ % ! i" #!8 ,$ % !. >From the de!nition of 8 ! in (32) and of 8 ,
in footnote 17, we have U#!8 !$ % " and U/!8,$ % ", where
U#!8 $ % 8$"1 $
!
#$ +
+
"$"1!#
!
$ #
"
#
8
"
U/!8 $ % 8$"1 $
!
#$ +
+
"$"1! #
#!8 $
$ #
"
#
8
9
The functions U#!9$ and U/!9$ are strictly increasing (recall that 18
(
1
%(8 ) $ #
)
% >!8 $ is a de-
creasing function of 8 ). Also, for any 8 % ", U#!8 $ % U/!8 $ if and only if #!8 $ % !. Con-
sider the case #!8 ,$ % !. In this case, U#!8 ,$ % U/!8 ,$ % ". Because U#!!8 $ % " and
U#!8 !$ % ", the result U#!8,$ % " implies 8 ! $ 8 ,. The property U/!!8 $ % " then implies
U/!8 !$ $ U/!8,$ % " % U#!8 !$. Because U#!8 $ % U/!8 $ in the current case i" #!8 $ % !, the
result U#!8 !$ % U/!8 !$ implies #!8 !$ % !. That is, #!8 ,$ % ! implies #!8 !$ % !. Similarly,
#!8,$ $ ! implies #!8 !$ $ !. Therefore, #!8 !$ % ! i" #!8,$ % !. QED
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